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Abstract
The Constitutional Court does not only interpreting the Constitution in judicial review cases. The Court 
also applies legal construction which include constitutional construction and statutory construction. This 
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A. Introduction
The rulings of the Constitutional Court (the 
CC or Mahkamah Konstitusi) can spark public 
debates. It is not rare to find a voice of dissent towards 
the rulings by politician or scholars but among them 
there were also supporters of the Court rulings. The 
debate gets even more intense whenever the Court 
issued a “conditionally (un)constitutional” ruling. 
Those who disagree with the approach by the Court 
argues that it overstepped the Court’s constitutional 
mandate. The Parliament even gets more agitated 
with the issuance of an amendment to the Law on 
the CC.1 It is a political move to control the Court. 
Apart from political debate and academic 
discourse, the Court has a number of rulings that are 
not only “to grant”, “to annul” or “non-admission” 
of the petition. A study is dedicated to identify and 
offers categorization of these atypical rulings of the 
CC.2 But other than that, scholarship on the topic 
is a rarity, in particular with regards to the issue 
of how the Court or judges discover the law. In 
criminal, private and administrative law, this topic 
has been well developed. Yet, the discourses on legal 
construction in constitutional law, in Indonesia, is 
still left vacant.
This article aims not to fill in the open room 
of that scholarship, for it is too ambitious with such 
limited space. It will present an argument in the 
context of the CC’s rulings. The rulings not only 
consist of interpretation but the Court also perform 
legal construction, as it will later be discuss. The 
distinction between interpretation and construction 
is not fully explored by the Indonesian legal scholars 
although the term is widely used. Therefore, in the 
beginning, it will review theoretical discourse in 
the Indonesian context on the distinction between 
interpretation and construction. The next chapter 
of the article will elaborates rulings wherein the 
Court apply legal construction. The Court objective 
to reconstruct the Law was to fill existing legal 
vacuums. In addition, it also explores circumstances 
which influence the CC to utilize legal construction. 
B. Discussion 
1. Distinction of Interpretation and Cons-
truction
The distinction between interpretation 
and construction has been discussed by the legal 
scholars and become a classical study. The diversity 
of legal system amongst countries contributes to 
this distinction. The civil law system provides a 
different legal interpretation from its brethren, the 
common law. This difference contributes a variety of 
nuance in creating legal norms.3 Some argue that the 
distinction between interpretation and construction 
is based on scholar’s respective impulse towards 
a certain legal system. In civil law countries, 
interpretation and construction are intermingled, 
whereas countries that adopted common law system 
are unequivocal in their distinction.4
In civil law countries, such as Indonesia, 
interpretation and construction are considers as part 
of the methods that judges use in their quest to find 
law (rechtsvinding). However, there is a discrepancy 
in Indonesian scholars on the methods that are 
constituted as construction. Sudikno Mertokusumo 
1 The DPR have issued an amendment to the Law on the CC (Law No. 8 of 2011). Article 57(2a) of the Law stipulated that the ruling of the CC 
may not contain: 
(a) ruling other than “to grant” or “to annul” the petition and declaration that the petition is “inadmissable”; 
(b) order to legislators; and 
(c) formulating a new text. 
However, this article was annuled by the CC in the ruling No. 48/PUU-IX/2011.
2  Atypical ruling may define as a type of decision wherein the Court panel use a different approach for the dictum rather than to apply the type of 
dictum as set forth in the Law of the CC. The study recorded 108 rulings (issued from 2003 to 2015) which divided into 4 categories, namely: 
(1) adding new norms; (2) modifying existing regulations; (3) suspending the enforceability of the ruling; and (4) to fill legal vacuums. See 
more in Bisariyadi, “Atypical Rulings of the Indonesian Constitutional Court”, Hasanuddin Law Review, Vol. 2, Issue 2, August 2016.
3 William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), as cited in Gunawan Widjaja, Lon Fuller, 
“Pembuatan Undang-Undang dan Penafsiran Hukum”, Law Review Fakultas Hukum Universitas Pelita Harapan, Vol. VI, No. 1 July 2006, p. 
31. 
4 Achmad Ali, 2002, Menguak Tabir Hukum (Suatu Kajian Filosofis dan Sosiologis), Gunung Agung Tbk, Jakarta, p. 144.
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opined that construction is also referred to as 
“exposition”. Mertokusumo referenced to the 
opinion of Alida Maria-Bos, who define exposition 
as “a method which constructs words or forms a 
definition, as opposed to describing an object”.5 
Exposition is set apart from other logic as analogy, 
appeal from the contrary (argumentum a contrario), 
and confining the meaning of text. This set of 
logic falls into comparative reasoning, therefore 
interpretation and analogy cannot be discrete.6 
On the other side, some legal scholars argue that 
analogy, a contrario and confinement of text are 
construction.7 Regardless the different opinion 
among scholar on what consist of construction, they 
share the same opinion that legal construction is use 
by any courts or judges in the absence of law.8 It is 
employed to fill the gap.
In common law countries, especially in the 
United States, there are many scholarly literatures 
that discusses the distinction between interpretation 
and construction. It also developed in the 
constitutional law.9 For instance, Keith Whittington 
authored two books which discussed on the topic 
of constitutional interpretation10 and constitutional 
construction.11 Other scholars, such as Lawrence 
B. Solum,12 Randy Barnett,13 and Laura Cisneros14 
also published scholarly reviews which focus on the 
difference between interpretation and construction. 
This notion had been around in the US since 
early 1800s. Among the first person who talk about 
interpretation and construction is Francis Lieber. 
He argues that hermeneutics is a branch of legal 
science which discusses principles and rules on 
interpretation and construction.15 He also offered 
nine fundamental principles and sixteen general 
principles on construction.16 These principles serve 
as regulatory instruction to understand text that 
requires interpretation or construction.
The difference between interpretation and 
construction can be observed from various pers-
pectives. From methodological view, interpretation 
is analogous to historical approach or intention 
of drafters of the text (originalist), whereas other 
methods (non-originalist) fall as construction. Yet 
distinction from this perspective can be blurred since 
the spectrum of variation between originalist and 
non-originalist is diverse.17 A perspective that offers 
a clearer distinction is by examines the process 
of finding meaning and the manifestation thereof. 
Lawrence B. Solum offers a definition of limitation 
5 Alida Maria-Bos, Over Methoden van begripsvorming in het recht. (AE.E Kluwer Deventer) as cited in Sudikno Mertokusumo, 2014, 
Penemuan Hukum Sebuah Pengantar, Cahaya Atma Pustaka, Yogyakarta, p. 94.
6  Sudikno Mertokusumo, Ibid., p. 95.
7  Jimly Asshidiqie, 1997, Teori & Aliran Penafsiran Hukum Tata Negara, ed. I, Ind. Hill Co., Jakarta, p. 17-18; also see Jazim Hamidi,2011, 
Hermeneutika Hukum Sejarah – Filsafat dan metode tafsir, revised edition, UB Press, Malang; Also see Ph. Visser’t Hoft, Penemuan Hukum, 
(Rechtsvinding), translated by B. Arief Sidharta, 2001, Laboratorium Hukum FH Univ Parahyangan, Bandung.
8 Jazim Hamidi, Ibid., p. 52-53; See also Sudikno Mertokusumo, Op. cit., p. 87.
9  In Common Law countries, statutory interpretation is set apart from constitutional interpretation. See James Allan Senior, “Constitutional 
Interpretation v. Statutory Interpretation”, Legal Theory, March 2000, p. 109-122; see also Kent Greenwalt, Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation, in Jules Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma and Scott J. Shapiro (eds), 2014, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
On the other hand, Civil Law countries only recognize “statutory interpretation” without any distinction to the constitutional interpretation. 
The constitutional interpretation is merely a specific form of statutory interpretation, see Heinrich Scholler, “Notes on Constitutional 
Interpretation”, Paper, January 2004 (limited publication by Hanns Seidel Foundation Indonesia).
10 For further analysis see Keith Whittington, 1999, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review, 
University Press of Kansas, Kansas.
11  Also see literature written by Keith Whittington, 1999, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge.
12  Lawrence B. Solum, “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction”, Constitutional Commentary, Vol. 27, 2010, p. 95.
13 Randy Barnett, “Interpretation and Construction”, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 34, 2011, p. 65-72.
14  Laura A. Cisneros, “The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A Useful Fiction”, Constitutional Commentary, Vol. 27, 2010, 
p. 71.
15 Francis Lieber, 1839, Legal and Political Hermeneutics: Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics, 3rd edition, 
Charles C. Little and James Brown, Boston, p. 55.
16 As quoted in James Farr, Amerikanisasi Hermeneutika: Legal and Political Hermeneutics karya Francis Lieber, in Gregory Leyh (ed), 2014, 
Hermeneutika Hukum: Sejarah, Teori dan Praktek, Nusa Media, Bandung, p. 141-145 (translation by M Khozim). 
17  The difference between originalists and non-originalist is a reality in constitutional law in the United States For a detailed discussion, see 
Laura A. Cisneros, Op. cit., p. 72.
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interpretation and construction in constitutional 
law. He define that 
Constitutional interpretation is the activity 
that discerns the communicative content 
(linguistic meaning) of the constitutional 
text. Constitutional construction is the 
activity that determines the content of 
constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of 
the constitutional text.18
These approaches appear identical. Both 
attempt to find the meaning of legal text. However, 
in terms of process, constructing is a step further 
then interpreting. Construction not only focuses 
on the meaning of a word or a phrase but also to 
produce a legal doctrine to be applied. 
The difference between construction and 
interpretation may be drawn between the terms 
“vagueness” and “ambiguity”. Solum argues that 
“... ambiguities in legal texts can be resolve by 
interpretation, but vagueness always requires 
construction.”19 
Article 18 (4) of the 1945 Constitution 
set a perfect example of ambiguous text in the 
Constitution. The phrase “democratically elected” 
which incorporated in the Article stipulate the 
condition by which regional government has to 
held the election of its head of government. The 
term “democratically” is ambiguous since it may 
have meaning that the election can be held through 
direct or indirect election. Both are considered as 
democratic. 
It is become an issue when a number of 
citizens lodged a petition to the CC on how the term 
“democratically elected” has to be interpreted.20 In 
its ruling, the Court took an originalist approach. 
It considered the opinions of the members of 
the People’s Representative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) who drafted 
the Amendment of the Constitution. The Court find 
that there was a political agreement in the MPR that 
the term “democratically elected” is intentionally 
formulated to be ambiguous. The reason behind 
this arrangement is to accommodate the design 
of election in special or autonomous regions. 
Therefore, it is practically impossible to have a 
uniform design of the head of regional government 
election. The phrase offer space for the lawmakers 
to design the most appropriate election mechanism 
in each region.21 The CC recognized the ambiguity 
of the phrase in Article 18(4) of the Constitution 
and allowed the lawmakers to have final decision 
whether to held direct or indirect election. Both 
have constitutional ground. 
In another ruling, the Court not just interpret 
but also reconstructs an Article of the Constitution 
due to the vagueness of its text. It can be found in 
the Court ruling which examine electricity case.22 
The Court have to construct the phrase “controlled 
by the state” as stipulated in Article 33 (3) of the 
1945 Constitution. The term is not ambiguous. 
It is vague. What does it mean by “controlled by 
the state”? There is no legal doctrine to be applied 
as measurement to this term. The Court, then, 
reconstructed it and holds that 
[...] the phrase “controlled by the state” must 
be interpreted to an extensive state’s control, 
which originated from the sovereignty of 
the Indonesian people, over its assets on 
“earth and water and the natural resources 
contained therein”, including the recognition 
of the public ownership by the people over 
the aforementioned assets. People, in mutual, 
as constructed by the 1945 Constitution give 
mandate to the state to make policies (beleid) 
and administer (bestuursdaad), regulate 
(regelendaad), manage (beheersdaad) and 
oversee (toezichthoudensdaad) in order to 
achieve the furthest possible welfare for the 
people.23
18 Lawrence B. Solum, “Originalism and Constitutional Construction”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, 2013, p. 457.
19 Lawrence B. Solum, “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction”, Op. cit., p. 98; meanwhile on the distinction between “vague” and 
“obscure” on the difference of phrases is “Ambiguity refers to words that have more than one sense or meaning. Vagueness refers to the 
penumbra or borderline of a word’smeaning, where it may be unclear whether a certain object is included within it or not.” see Randy Barnett, 
Op. cit., p. 67.
20 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 072-073/PUU-II/2004 on the Judicial Review on Law No. 32 of 2004 on Local Government.
21  Ibid.
22 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 on Review of Law No. 20 of 2002 on Electricity.
23 Ibid.
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The CC’s construction over the terms “controlled by 
the state” became a legal doctrine. First, it serves as 
a measure to review the state policy on electricity. In 
electricity case the Court held that the state’s right 
to control important and vital commodities does not 
necessarily signify that the state must own 100% 
of corporate shares as long as the management 
(beheersdaad) of the corporation is in the state’s 
hand.24 Therefore, privatization is permitted only 
if the state still holds primary authority to decide 
company policies.
The objective of legal construction is to fill 
legal gaps.25 It is inevitable since every country 
are experiencing legal gaps. It is included in the 
constitutional law. The gaps indentified in different 
terms (in example: legal vacuum, legislative 
ommissions). It results in a myriad of issues 
in comparative approach. The Conference of 
European Constitutional Courts held a conference 
in June 2008 that was intended to discuss the issue 
of legal vacuum that occur in European states.26 
The Conference Reports revealed that the existence 
of legal vacuum is due to objective and subjective 
factors.27 The objective causative of legal gaps 
means that the ever-changing dynamics of society 
moving at a more faster pace that the creation 
of rules. Thus, legal norms will always be a lag 
behind. The subjective causative means that it put 
emphasize on the lawmakers. It is because of the 
inability of lawmakers to anticipate development 
that create gaps between law and society.
However, Hans Kelsen has a different 
opinion. He argues that legal gap is inconceivable. 
Gap cannot manifest from the absence of a norm. 
When there is not any law regulate on a certain 
condition that occurs then such condition is not 
necessarily a legal gap. The law simply has not been 
extended towards the phenomenon, thus this does 
not mean that the law is absence. This approach 
proposes that a phenomenon that is not explicitly 
prohibited, in nature, is permitted.28 Kelsen opined
It is the fiction that the legal order has a 
gap, meaning that prevailing law cannot be 
applied to a concrete case because there is 
no general norm which refers to this case. 
The idea is that it is logically impossible to 
apply the actually valid law to a concrete case 
because the necessary premise is missing.29
In Indonesia, legal gap is considered identical to the 
term rechtsvacuum. But, some legal scholars contend 
that the term rechtsvacuum is not similar to legal 
gap. They coined another term.30 To put in context, 
the term refers to the absences of regulations.31 The 
legal system in Indonesian which adopted codified 
laws have a strong possibility of gaps due to the 
absence of regulations. Consequently, individual 
citizens or legal entities may raise a question in the 
application of judicial review to the CC.
The authority of the CC, in nature, is to review 
the Law in conformity with the Constitution. This 
mechanism is intended to serve as a compelling tool 
to ensure that lawmakers adhere to constitutional 
values. Therefore, it upholds constitutionalism 
which is required in a constitutional democratic 
state in accordance with the rule of law.32 The 
constitutional mandate of the CC is to conduct a 
review. Yet, the nature of the task itself has shifted. 
In a number of rulings, the Court not only interprets 
the text of the Constitution but also tends to apply 
24  Ibid.
25 Yudha Bhakti Ardhiwisastra, 2008, Penafsiran dan Konstruksi Hukum, Penerbit Alumni, Bandung, p. 52. See also Ahmad Rifai, 2014, 
Penemuan Hukum oleh Hakim dalam Perspektif Hukum Progresif, ed. 3, Penerbit Sinar Grafika, Jakarta, p. 74.
26  Venice Commission, “Problems of Legislative Ommission in Constitutional Jurisprudence”, http://www.venice.coe.int/files/Bulletin/
SpecBull-legislative-omission-e.pdf, accessed on 24 October 2016.
27  Ibid.
28 The approach of Kelsen is similar to ushul fiqh in Islamic law which provides that “the origin of the law on a matter is permission until there 
is change to the origin of law” . See Imam Asy Syaukani, Fathul Qadir, 1/64. Mawqi’ Ruh Al Islam.
29 Hans Kelsen, 1949, General Theory of Law and State, Harvard University Press, Massachussets, p. 146.
30 Jazim Hamidi introduced the term wetsvacuum instead of rechtsvacuum, see Jazim Hamidi, Op. cit., p. 52.
31 Bagir Manan, 1992, Dasar-Dasar Perundang-Undangan Indonesia, IND-HILL.Co, Jakarta, p. 72-73.
32  I Dewa Gede Palguna, 2008, Mahkamah Konstitusi, Judicial Review dan Welfare State, Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah 
Konstitusi, Jakarta, p. 51.
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legal construction. The application of construction 
not only in terms of constitutional construction but 
the Court also extend it reconstruct the norms in the 
Laws. 
2. The Usage of Construction in the Court’s 
Rulings
The Court’s opinions in judicial review 
cases contain interpretation or construction of the 
text in the Constitution. But more so often that the 
Court reconstruct the challenged article in the Law. 
It means that the Court also perform a statutory 
construction. 
a. Constitutional Construction
The steps that are taken by the Court 
in the consideration of judicial review cases, 
firstly, is to deals with the constitutional 
issues beforehand. Hence, the Court need 
to see whether an article in the Constitution 
was vague or ambiguous. Afterward, 
the Court will examine the case and use 
the interpretation or construction of the 
Constitution to measure the constitutionality 
of the Law under reviewed. This referred to 
as legal construction at constitutional level. 
As it has been discuss earlier, in electricity 
case, the Court reconstruct the meaning of 
the terms “controlled by the state” in Article 
33 (3) of the 1945 Constitution.
In addition, the Court must examine the 
question on whether presidential election and 
members of legislative election must be held 
in separate or simultaneous. This question 
was raise in consideration of the article in the 
Law of Presidential Election was challenged. 
The article stipulated that “The election for 
President and Vice President is held after 
the election for members of legislative.”33 
Furthermore, constitutional convention, as 
practice in the 1999, 2004 and 2014 elections, 
shows that presidential election and legislative 
election were schedule in a different period. 
Nonetheless, the Constitution is silent on the 
issue. 
There are two Court’s ruling regarding 
this issue. In the first ruling, the CC held that 
the existing practice wherein presidential 
election held after the election for parliament 
members consider as a political custom 
(desuetudo) that took place of laws, which is 
silent on the issue.34 Due to public acceptance, 
the custom is not breaching any laws even if 
it lacks on constitutional ground.35 Implicitly, 
the CC recognizes the existence of legal 
vacuum or lack of constitutional legitimacy 
on how the mechanism of both elections 
should be held. 
However, the law was challenge for 
the second time.36 Against the first ruling, 
the Court offered a different opinion.37 
The majority of the Court altered the first 
judgment. The CC argue, in the second ruling, 
that constitutional custom as considered in 
the previous Court’s ruling is not similar to 
a constitutional text to be set as to determine 
33 Article 3 (5) of Law No. 42 of 2008 on Presidential Election that was examined by the Constitutional Court Ruling on case Number 14/PUU-
XI/2013.
34 The Coonstitutional Court Ruling on case Number 51-52-59/PUU-VI/2008.
35 Ibid.
36 The Constitutional Court Ruling on case Number 14/PUU-XI/2013.
37 The composition of the panel of judges who ruled on the two rulings is difference. The panel of judges who ruled on Ruling No. 51-52-59/
PUU-VI/2008 is Moh. Mahfud MD., Maruarar Siahaan, Maria Farida Indrati, Achmad Sodiki, Abdul Mukthie Fadjar, M. Akil Mochtar, M. 
Arsyad Sanusi, and Muhammad Alim. While, the composition of the panel of judges who ruled on Ruling Number 14/PUU-XI/2013 is Moh. 
Mahfud MD, Achmad Sodiki, M. Akil Mochtar, Hamdan Zoelva, Muhammad Alim, Ahmad Fadlil Sumadi, Maria Farida Indrati, Harjono, 
and Anwar Usman. There are four constutional judges who were present in the two rulings: Moh. Mahfud MD, Maria Farida Indrati, Achmad 
Sodiki and Akil Mochtar. In the first ruling (Ruling No. 51-52-59/PUU-VI/2008), three constitutional judges were dissent: Abdul Mukthie 
Fadjar, Maruarar Siahaan dan M. Akil Mochtar. Therefore, in the second ruling only Akil Mochtar stay with his opinion while Moh. Mahfud 
MD, Maria Farida Indrati, and Achmad Sodiki changed their stances. 
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constitutionality of law. The binding force of 
custom of convention is similar to a moral 
reading of the Constitution. The Court also 
coined the term “constitutional morality”.38 
In its second ruling, the CC reconstructed 
Article 6A (2) and 22E (2) of the 1945 
Constitution. Beforehand, the Court considers 
three related factors on the issue, namely (1) 
relationship between electoral system and 
presidential system as form of governance, 
(2) the intention of the Amendment of 1945 
Constitution drafters, (3) the efficiency of 
electoral management, and the right of citizen 
to use their vote wisely.39 In conclusion, the 
CC reconstructs the text of the Constitution 
and held in a majority that presidential and 
member of legislative elecion must be held 
on the same day. 
The second ruling of the Court was 
supported by a number of legal scholars. 
Former Chief Justice of the CC, Jimly 
Asshiddiqie, expressed his support of the 
Court’s ruling where he endorses that the 
ruling would implied to the strengthening 
of presidential system.40 But there are also 
scholars who have opposing views, as voiced 
one of them by Yusril Ihza Mahendra.41 
Apart from the academic debate, the 
Court’s ruling will have its binding force 
to be applied in 2019 election. Numerous 
preparations must be undertaken from 
installing the legal framework, reorganizing 
electoral institutions as well as preparation 
for election logistics.42
b. Statutory construction 
The examination of judicial review 
case designates the CC to decipher the text 
of the Constitution. In terms of the vague 
and ambiguous terms in the Constitution, 
the Court must give an explanation to the 
text. The CC performs interpretation or 
construction. In this regards, the CC plays the 
role as final interpreter of the Constitution. 
On the contrary, the Court also find 
that numerous article in the Constitution 
has a clear meaning which the Court need 
no further reading.43 In this context, the CC 
acted as guardian of the Constitution. The 
CC’s role was to safeguard values and spirit 
of the Constitution so that the essence of 
the Constitution is consistently portrayed in 
every law and regulation. 
In its role as guardian, the Court shall 
not be limited to the petition of applicants. It 
is arranged in accordance with their personal 
interest. The idea of the Court should not 
be bound by laws trouble the Parliament. It 
attempted to limit this notion. In the revision 
of Law on the CC, the lawmakers proposed 
that the CC shall not issue ruling in which 
it (i) contains dictum no other than what is 
challenged by applicants, (ii) contains order 
to lawmakers and (iii) contains formulations 
of a new norm.44 This provision was intended 
38 The Constitutional Court Ruling on case Number 14/PUU-XI/2013.
39  Ibid.
40 Hukumonline,“Pemilu Serentak Bertingkat Perkuat Sistem Presidensial”, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5387e6702f78c/pemilu-
serentak-bertingkat-perkuat-sistem-presidensial, accesed on 11 October 2016. See also Zainal Arifin Hoesein, “Pemilihan Umum Serentak: 
Analisis terhadap Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 14/PUU-XI/2013”, Jurnal Veritas, May 2015, p. 2-30. Also see the opinion of Saldi 
Isra, “(Bukan) Putusan yang Hambar”, Kompas, 27 January 2014.
41 Liputan6, “Pemilu Serentak 2019, Yusril: Putusan MK Salah dan Memalukan”, http://news.liputan6.com/read/817047/pemilu-serentak-
2019-yusril-putusan-mk-salah-dan-memalukan, accessed on 11 October 2016. Also see DPR, “Polemik Menjelang Pemilu 2014 dan Suksesi 
Kepemimpinan Nasional, http://www.dpr.go.id/doksetjen/dokumen/minangwan-seminar-Polemik-Menjelang-Pemilu-2014-dan-Suksesi-
Kepemimpinan-Nasional-1432262788.pdf, accessed on 11 October 2016.
42 Electoral Research Institute Indonesia, “Position Paper Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019”, http://www.rumahpemilu.com/public/
doc/2015_02_03_08_18_33_POSITION%20PAPER%20PEMILU%20SERENTAK%202019.pdf, accessed at 11 October 2016.
43 Constitutional interpretation is analogous to interpretation method in Islamic Law. Al-Qur’an as the primary source of Islamic law contains 
verses that are muhkamat (the meaning is evident) and verses that are mutasyabihat (the meaning is vague and requires interpretation), as 
stated in QS 3:7. 
44 As stipulated in Article 57 (2a) of Law No. 8 of 2011 concerning The Consttitutional Court (State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia Year 
2011 Number 70, Supplement to State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia Number 5226).
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to cease the CC to issue atypical rulings. A 
form of atypical rulings by the Court was also 
known where it delivers a “(un)constitutionally 
conditional” ruling. The Court responded by 
repealing the law and that it is in accordance 
with the Constitution. It held that the law 
will impede the Constitutional Court from (i) 
conducting a review on constitutionality of 
norms, (ii) embed legal gap, and (iii) probing 
legal values and justice within society.45 An 
underline must be put in place where the 
Court argue that the consideration of issued 
such decision is to embed the existence of 
gaps in regulation.
The “(un)constitutionally conditional” 
ruling imply that apart from interprets 
the meaning of text, it also reconstructs 
the law. There have been 108 rulings in 
which the Court issue these type of rulings. 
Reconstruction of the text of laws by the 
Court includes where it insert new phrases or 
altering the existing text. 
Considering various types of atypical 
rulings, the Court objectives to employ 
constructional approach are (1) to resolve 
vagueness of text in the law; (2) to embed 
legal vacuums; and (3) to protect and to 
give remedy of citizens constitutional rights 
impaired by government action due to the 
enforcement of laws.
1) Redefine Vague Text 
One principle in drafting law and 
regulation is the clarity of content.46 If 
the formulation of the text in regulation 
is obscure then it is an infringement 
from a legal certainty. In a number 
of rulings, the Court held that a law 
is in contradiction to the Constitution 
due to the obscure formulation of the 
text in its content. And obscurity led 
to uncertainty. Therefore, the Court 
reformulates the text by inserting new 
phrases or altering the existing text.
In 2010, the Court issued a 
decision which drew public attention 
since, one of the reason, it was lodged 
by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a former 
Justice Secretary. He filed a petition 
for a review of the Law on Attorney, 
especially with regards to the phrase 
“the end of term of Attorney General”.47 
The Law stipulated that Attorney 
General shall be released from the 
office by the end of his term.48 The 
phrase “by the end of his term” was 
considered to be obscure and resulted 
in uncertainty, in consideration of 
Mahendra. He posits that due to the 
obscurity in the text, he had suffered 
an injury to his constitutional rights. 
He, by the time the application 
was submitted, was named a 
suspect in the corruption case over 
the procurement of Legal Entities 
Administration System (Sistem 
Administrasi Badan Hukum or 
sisminbakum).49 A decision to named 
a person as a suspect is the authority 
of Attorney General. The case was 
brought up since the Attorney General 
terms of office, which at the time was 
held by Hendarman Supandji, was 
indeterminate. It was interconnected 
and closely linked to the changes of 
governmental administration after 
2009 election, from Soesilo Bambang 
45  The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 48/PUU-IX/2011.
46 Article 5 of Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Guideline for Drafting Laws and Regulations (State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia Year 2011 
Number 82, Supplement to State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia Number 5234).
47 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 49/PUU-VIII/2010 on the Review of Law No. 16 of 2004 on Attorney.
48 As stipulated in Article 22 (1d) of Law No. 16 Year 2004 concerning The State Attorney (State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia Year 2004 
Number 67, Supplement to State Gazette of The Republic of Indonesia Number 4401).
49 Detiknews, “Ini Kronologi Kasus Sisminbakum”, http://news.detik.com/berita/1929720/ini-kronologi-kasus-sisminbakum, accessed at 11 
October 2016
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Yudhoyono – Jusuf Kalla (2004-2009) 
to Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono – 
Boediono (2009-2014). 
Hendarman Supandji was 
appointed as Attorney General during 
the first presidential term of Soesilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono in 2007.50 
Yudhoyono intended to maintain 
Hendarman Supandji as Attorney 
General in his second term. Therefore, 
the Decree on the dissolution of his 
first cabinet which was accompanied 
by a Decree on the formation of a new 
cabinet did not include the appointment 
of the Attorney General.51 
Referring to the phrase “by the 
end of his term”, as challenged by 
Mahendra, the Court describe that the 
term of office for Attorney General 
can be determined through four 
models: (1) according to the terms 
of office of the administration and/or 
the President; (2) according to certain 
period which different to the rest 
political appointees in the cabinet; (3) 
according to age limitation or pension 
and; (4) by the discretion of the 
President.52 The Court concluded that 
the possibility of these models resulted 
create uncertainty stemming from the 
obscure formulation of text. 
The CC reconstructed the phrase 
“by the end of his term” and inserting 
new phrase where the Court formulate 
that “the Attorney General term of 
office is aligned with the President and 
the member of Cabinet term of office 
or can be dismissed from the office by 
the President.”53
In other rulings, the Court find 
indecisive content in Laws which 
encourage it to insert new text or 
alter them. There are two examples 
in the Law on Criminal Procedure 
where the Court find obscurity in the 
text. First, the phrase “third party” in 
relation to parties that allow inquiring 
legality of the termination of criminal 
procedure as stipulated in article 80 
of the Law on Criminal Procedure.54 
The Court held that “third party” may 
include victim or applicant, public 
independent institutions or communal 
organizations. 
Second, the phrase “promptly” 
regarding the duration of arrest 
warrant copy be delivered to the 
family of the accused as stipulated in 
the Criminal Procedure Law.55 The 
Court reconstructed the text of the Law 
stating that the term “promptly” must 
be read “promptly and within seven 
days.56
2) Embed Legal Gaps
The Court embedded legal gaps 
which included in this group is not only 
in the context of to fill in the vacuums 
but also it consist of where the Court 
50 Based on Presidential Decree Number 31/P Year 2007.
51 Due to the end of Presidential Term of 2004 – 2009 on 20 Oktober 2009, the President issued a Decree Number 83/P Year 2009 that dissolve 
Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu. Hendarman Supandji as Attorney General was not included on the dissolution decree. He also did not included 
in Presidential Decree Number 84/P Tahun 2009 on the establishment of Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu II (terms 2009 – 2014). The government 
argue that Hendarman Supandji as Attorney General was based on the decree of his appointment which was not release from the office in 
accordance to the Decree of the dissolution of Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu. 
52  Constitutional Court Ruling No. 49/PUU-VIII/2010, Paragraph [3.31]
53  Ibid.
54 Article 80 Law 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure stipulated “Request to examine the legality of termination of investigation can be submitted 
by the investigator or attorney or the third party eith interest to the Head of the court and stipulating the condition” 
See the Constitutional Court Ruling Number 98/PUU-X/2012
55  Article 18(3) Law No. 8 of 1981 on Criminal Procedure stipulated “Copy of arrest warrant as presribed in paragraph (1) must be delivered to 
the family promptly after the arrest”
56  The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 3/PUU-XI/2013.
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anticipated the possibility of gaps. As 
the result of the annulment of laws, 
especially the law as a whole, by the 
Court, there will be gaps and the Court 
require to fill the condition where the 
law was absent. 
As an example is where the Court 
considered the absence of regulation 
in a certain condition as it happened in 
the head of local government election. 
The lawmakers when drafting the 
Law on Head of Local Government 
Election (Law No. 8 of 2015), 
intended to design the election must 
be held with the participation of more 
than one one candidate. Yet, reality 
speaks different words. In 2015 local 
election, there were four regions where 
only one candidate participated. They 
were in District of Blitar, District of 
Tasikmalaya, District of North Timor 
Tengah and City of Mataram.57 The 
condition is a perfect example of legal 
gaps due to the absence of regulation 
on the issue. 
It was a constitutional issue in 
regards to the application to review the 
Law on single candidacy issue.58 In its 
ruling, the Court recognized the signs 
of vacuum where it stated: “…legal 
vacuum exist when the requirement of 
participated by at least two candidates 
is not fulfilled, in which the local 
election can not be held.”59 The CC 
strongly contend that election must still 
be held with only a single candidate 
participates. It, then, reconstructed 
the law on the text. Furthermore, the 
Court also indicate that the ballot must 
be designed to give the opportunity for 
voters to the expression of “Agree” or 
“Disagree”.60
In the later example is the rulings 
of the Court which reconstructed the 
law in the anticipation of gaps. These 
rulings tend to be found in rulings 
where the Court annulled the law as 
a whole. In this sort of condition, it 
inclined to reinstate the previous law 
that rules the same issue. For example, 
in electricity case, the Court annulled 
the Law on Electricity (Law No. 20 of 
2002) and reinstated the previous Law 
(Law No. 15 of 1985).61 In a similar 
vein is in the instance of cooperation 
case62 and in water resources case.63 
There lies similarity in the review 
of those cases, wherein the Court 
reviewed an article within the Laws 
which considered as its “core”. As 
consequences, the annulment of the 
aforementioned articles would make 
the law incoherent. The Court required 
to apply legal construction and not 
merely interpret.
3) Redress Citizen Constitutional 
Right 
The court main objective to 
apply legal construction is to give 
remedy to the rights of the citizens 
that have been damage.64 But, the issue 
lies in its unique adoption to assess the 
standing of an individual to be a party 
in judicial review case. The standing is 
57 KPU, “Calon Tunggal, Perppu dan Kekosongan Hukum”, Suara KPU, July-August, 2015, p. 4.
58 Registered by the Court with Case No. 100/PUU-XIII/2015, filed by Effendi Ghazali.
59 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 100/PUU-XIII/2015, paragraph [3.13].
60  Ibid.
61 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 p. 350.
62 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 28/PUU-XI/2013, paragraf [3.25]; the CC reinstate Law No. 25 of 1992 on Cooperation.
63 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 85/PUU-XI/2013, paragraph [3.32]; the CC reinstate Law No. 11 of 1974 on Irigation. 
64 Bisariyadi, “Yudisialisasi Politik dan Sikap Menahan Diri: Peran Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Menguji Undang-Undang”, Jurnal Konstitusi, 
Vol. 12, No. 3, September 2015, p. 483.
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classified as quasi actio popularis.65 It 
is a mixture between normative review 
applied by individual citizen (actio 
popularis) and the application of 
standing requirement for an individual 
in a constitutional complaint case. An 
individual is required to demonstrate 
the existence or potential loss that has 
or will be suffered due to the enactment 
of the challenged laws. Consequently, 
the Court’s rulings will restore the 
rights of the individual. 
With this mixture of adoption 
between constitutional complaint and 
actio popularis, the Court’s ruling on 
judicial review finds itself in between 
altering abstract norms as well as 
restoring the constitutional rights of 
citizens. In this position, the Court is 
expected to be thorough in its ruling in 
order to not only give remedy to the 
individual rights of the party but also 
to consider that the rulings may also 
cause an effect to whole society.
An example is where the court 
issued a ruling in electronic document 
and information law case66 as applied 
by Setya Novanto.67 In this ruling, 
the Court granted the applicant and 
reconstructed the related laws.68 To put 
it in a nutshell, the Court recognized 
that there is a flaw of the procedure on 
wiretapping, especially in recording 
a private conversation. Wiretapping 
is fundamentally an act of violation 
to the privacy. Therefore, the state 
must carefully design and regulate 
the activity. In this framework, the 
Court emphasized that interception, 
in which include recording, must be 
conducted in accordance with the 
law.69 For instance, it has to have court 
permission as a form of control and 
supervision to prevent misconduct.70 
The ruling was later become the 
ground for the Honorary Council of 
the House of Representatives (Majelis 
Kehormatan Dewan DPR or MKD 
DPR) to examine Novanto case on 
the allegation of breaching ethics as 
member of parliament. The MKD DPR, 
as refers to the Court’s ruling, held that 
the recording, as the primary ground 
of evidence to examine Novanto, was 
acquired in an unlawful procedure.71 
Subsequently, the right for privacy of 
Setya Novanto was restored.
In the same instance, the ruling 
sparks debate over a criminal case 
which drew public attention, popular 
as, “the murder with cyanide coffee”. 
Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) 
recording was submitted as evidence by 
the prosecutor to charge the defendant, 
65 Bisariyadi, “Constitutional Complaint atau Actio Popularis: Kedudukan Hukum Perorangan dalam Perkara Konstitusi”, Majalah Konstitusi, 
Desember 2015, p. 74.
66 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 10/PUU-XIV/2016.
67  Setya Novanto, also a Speaker of the DPR, is coceide allegedly involve in bribery case, popular as “papa requested for share”. Novanto was 
ask for PT. Freeport Indonesia shares and use President Joko Widodo name to increase the possibility of that shares. The request was recorded 
by the CEO of PT FI, Maroef Sjamsoeddin and the recording was submitted by the Energy and Mineral Resources Secretary, as evidence and 
part of the petition to MKD DPR. See Merdeka,“Kronologi Lengkap kasus Papa Minta Saham sampai bikin Setnov mundur”, https://www.
merdeka.com/peristiwa/kronologis-lengkap-kasus-papa-minta-saham-sampai-bikin-setnov-mundur.html, accessed at 24 Oktober 2016.
68  The Court ruled that the phrase “electronic Information and/or Document” as stipulated in Article 5 (1) and (2), Article 44b Law No. 11 of 
2008 and Article 26A Law No. 20 of 2001 must be read especially in the phrase “electronic Information and/or Document” as an evidence 
before the Court in the request of police, attorney, and/or other law enforcement as prescribed in the Law in accordance to the Article 31(3) 
Law No. 11 of 2008 on Electronic information and transaction.” 
69 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 20/PUU-XIV/2016, p. 92.
70  Ibid., p. 94.
71 Republika, “MKD Pulihkan Nama Baik Setya Novanto, Inilah Isi Suratnya”, Republika, Wednesday 28 September 2016, http://rmol.co/dpr/
read/2016/09/28/262382/MKD-Pulihkan-Nama-Baik-Setya-Novanto,-Inilah-Isi-Suratnya-, accessed at 24 October 2016.
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Jessica Wongso. The prosecutor indict 
Wongso had placed cyanide that has 
cause the death of Mirna Salihin. In 
reference to the same Court ruling, 
the defense lawyer argued that the 
CCTV recording was obtained by the 
prosecutor is not in accordance with 
the law.72
The ruling of the Court itself 
unfolded few possibilities. The Court 
argued that the acquisition of electronic 
information and/or document as 
evidence was requested by the police, 
prosecutor and/or other judicial 
institutions. In this context, the Court 
have narrowed the meaning of the text 
suggesting that electronic information 
and document can only be obtained in 
the request of law enforcement. 
On the other hand, the Court also 
implied the possibility that electronic 
document, including recording, can 
be considered as legal evidence if 
the procedure of its acquirement 
is explained before the court 
(bewijsvoering).73 In other words, the 
Court emphasizes on the procedure of 
acquiring evidence as opposed to the 
actors of whom request the evidence.
The above are examples of 
the dilemma faced by the Court in 
the abstract review of law in abstract 
norm in conjunction to protect 
individual rights. A ruling of the Court 
to reinstate rights a citizen may not 
be applicable in another case. The 
nature of judicial review is its abstract 
character and its binding force to all 
citizens (erga omnes). Consequently, 
a ruling requires a holistic approach 
as well as judicial wisdom and 
craftmanship of constitutional judges 
in examination and rule on each and 
every constitutional issue.
C. Conclusion 
The CC is the interpreter of the Constitution. 
In its authority to review the constitutionality of a 
law, the Court is bind not only interpret but also 
to apply legal construction. In such a context, 
the Court not only plays the role as “interpreter” 
function but also as “guardian” of the Constitution. 
In order to safeguard and oversee constitutional 
values, the Court obliged to reconstructed the laws. 
The numbers of rulings in which the Court utilized 
construction approach has grown in number.74
This research offers three conditions that 
require the Court to reconstruct the law, namely: 
(i) when the text in the law is obscure or vague; 
(ii) in order to fill legal gaps; and (iii) to reinstate 
citizen’s constitutional rights. Furthermore, it also 
finds that the Court not only reconstructs the law 
or statutory construction but it also reconstructs the 
Constitutional text or constitutional construction.
This is a practice that requires thoroughness 
as well as creativity. The Court ruling needs to 
consist of comprehensive and convincing legal 
argument. The Court also required elaborating 
its legal reasoning which prompted it to take a 
construction approach. It is not an easy task since 
the only tool possessed by the Court in acquiring 
legitimacy over its ruling is its logic and rational 
in decision making. In the ruling where the Court 
alters a government policy the task even gets harder. 
Only in thorough and holistic argument that the 
Court find its legitimacy to change any policy and 
to alters any laws that are not in conformity with the 
Constitution.
72 Solopos, “Inilah Efek Setya Novanto yang Menguntungkan Jessica Wongso”, http://www.solopos.com/2016/09/26/inilah-efek-setya-novanto-
yang-menguntungkan-jessica-wongso-756019, accessed at 24 October 2016.
73 The Constitutional Court Ruling No. 20/PUU-XIV/2016.
74  In reference to the ruling’s dictum on conditionally (un)constitutional in comparison to the judicial review rulings from 2003-2015, the 
percentage is 12%. In details, the “conditionally (un)constitutional” from 2003 to 2015 in total 108 rulings and judicial review case from 2003 
to 2015 in total 858 rulings.
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